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Estate Taxation-The Doctrine of Recriprocal Trusts
The doctrine of reciprocal trusts in the federal tax field had its hum-2
ble beginning in 1940 when Lehman v. Commissioner was decided
The doctrine rests upon the principle that "a person who furnishes the
consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor, even though in
form the trust was created by another." 3 Thus, A creates a trust for
the life benefit of B with remainders over and B creates a trust for the
life benefit of A with remainders over. 4 These trusts would escape
estate tax burdens entirely but for the "reciprocal" or "crossed" trusts
doctrine, which looks to the substance of the transaction and thereby
regards A as the grantor of the trust of which B was the nominal
grantor.
Various provisions or powers may be crossed by the settlors: powers
to alter, amend, revoke or terminate;5 powers of appointment;O life
estates ;7 and reversionary interests.8 Crossing of any of these provisions
may give rise to estate taxation if the trust would be included in the
estate of a settlor who reserved those powers to himself 9 and if, in fact,
the trusts are found to be reciprocal.
In order for the doctrine to apply, there must be an express finding
that the trusts were in "consideration" of each other, which means the
giving of a quid pro quo.10 The term "consideration" has given the
courts much difficuty. The predominant view seems to be that circum1 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U. S.637 (1940).

'New Jersey had used the doctrine in1932. In re Perry's Estate, 111 N. J.Eq.
176, 162 A. 146 (1932).
'Lehman v.Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310
U. S. 637 (1940). See Marks, The Switching of Settlors in Inter Vivos Trusts,
26 TAxEs 622 (1948) for a criticism of the doctrine.
'Reciprocity may exist in a series of trusts benefiting three or four settlors.
See In re Jones' Estate, 350 Pa. 120, 38 A. 2d 30 (1944) and Commissioner v.
Warner, 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
168A STAT. 383, 26 U. S. C. 2038 (1954). See Lehman v. Commissioner, 109
F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U. S. 636 (1940) ; Hanauer's Estate v.
Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U. S.770 (1945) ;
Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Commissioner
v. Dravo, 119 F. 2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Colonial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 740 (2d Cir. 1940).
'68A STAT. 385, 26 U. S. C. 2041 (1954). See Fish v. Commissioner, 45
B. T. A. 120 (1941). See also Estate of Sinclaire v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 742
(1942).
7
68A STAT. 382, 26 U. S. C. 2036 (1954). See Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F. 2d 537
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S.810 (1951) ; Cole's Estate v. Commissioner,
140 F. 2d 635 (8th Cir. 1944); McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N. D. Ill.
1955) (contingent life estates) ;Eckhardt v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 673 (1945).
'68A STAT. 382, 26 U. S. C. 2037 (1954). See Estate of Hill v. Commissioner,
23 T. C.No. 77 (1954).
' See Tobin v.Commissioner, 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950) (income tax), where
H and W set up two trusts, the income of each was to be paid to the other spouse
as the advisory committee should direct. See also Commissioner v. Dravo, 119
F. 2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941), where the corpus was to be advanced.
'0Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied
326 U. S.770 (1945).

1956]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

stances showing concert of action or interdependence will support the
finding of consideration."' Opposed to this authority stands the Third
12
Circuit which insists that the powers be bargained for and exchanged.
Although the commissioner's determination that the trusts were in consideration of each other is presumptively correct, the circuit courts have
disagreed as to what kind of and how much evidence is needed to rebut
this presumption.' 3
Various factors are weighed in making the necessary finding that
one trust was in "consideration" of the other. In Hanauer'sEstate v.
Commissioner14 the Second Circuit held that the simultaneous execution
of the trust plus the wife's mental attitude of leaving investment matters
in the hands of her husband were sufficient to support the Tax Court's
finding that the trusts were made in consideration of each other. Estate
of Carrie S. Newberry' 5 also upheld the commissioner's determination
where the trusts were created "after frequent consultations by decedent's
husband with his financial advisors, and by the decedent and her husband with their attorney, and after discussions between themselves"
even though the technical provisions and the form were determined by
the lawyer.
It is particularly difficult to rebut the presumption of a tacit agreement or concert of action when the res of each trust is similar in amount,
the beneficial interests are identical and the trusts are executed within
a short time of each other. 16 In Orvis v. Higgins17 the evidence showed
that the trusts were created within six days of each other, that the two
settlors consulted the same attorney within thirteen days of each other,
but that neither settlor was present at the execution of the other's trust.
Although all the evidence tended to show in a negative manner that
neither trustor knew of the other's intention, the court held that it was
error for the Tax Court to find no reciprocity since the clear inference
from the facts was that there must have been a concert of action.
In those cases where the commissioner has been upheld, the courts
have indicated that the presence of other motives does not affect the
situation. For example, where the trusts expressed the motive of keeping the stock within the family, the court found this to be unimportant
21 Ibid.

Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 873 (3d Cir. 1953).
McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N. D. Ill. 1955).
24 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 326 U. S. 770 (1945).
1947 P-H T. C. Mem. Dec. 387, aff'd per curiam 172 F. 2d 220 (3d Cir. 1949).
But see Estate of Lindsay
10 Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T. C. 673 (1945).
v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 174 (1943), where it was said that these factors were not
conclusive that the trusts were interdependent and in consideration of each other.
946 (1945) (income tax).
See also Wiebolt v. Commissioner, 5 T. C.
" 180 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U. S.810 (1950).
12
2
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as the grantors could have carried out this motive by giving 18the stock
to their children without reserving crossed income provisions.
Unfortunately all is not bread and gravy for the government, especially in the Third Circuit which has limited the Lehman doctrine to an
actual consideration test.1 9 Another court, following the position of the
Third Circuit, has said: "If a person other than the nominal settlor is
to be treated as the actual settlor for tax purposes he must have paid
something of value to the nominal settlor." 20 When the court looks
for an actual bargain and exchange of powers, mutual love and affection
for the settlors' children is not regarded as legal consideration so as to
21
bring the trusts within the scope of the reciprocity doctrine.
Furthermore, when the actual consideration test is applied, the existence of other motives plays an important part in the determination of a
case. The Third Circuit said that W's motive of assuring H of independent wealth had a bearing on intentions with respect to unity of purpose, interdependence and consideration or lack of it and the court held
that such a motive was one of the factors showing that the trusts were
not reciprocal. 22 In Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner23 the motive
behind the creation of the trusts was to protect the children from improvident marriages. H's trust was suggested by his brother and after
making his decision, H discussed his trust with W as both handled the
family's affairs. W, in creating a similar trust, told the attorney that
if such an arrangement was good enough for H, it was good enough for
her. Although the trusts contained identical securities and were executed
at the same time, the court held that the reciprocal trust doctrine did not
apply even. though each time H added to his trust W did the same.
Great stress was laid on the testimony of H that he would have created
his trust regardless of whether W decided on a similar course.
See also
1" Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
Orvis v. Higgins, note 17 supra.
10 See In re Leuder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947), which quotes with
approval REsTATEmENT, CoTrRACrs § 75 (1932): "Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forebearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise bargained for
and given inexchange for the promise."
20 McLain v.Jarecki, 126 F.Supp. 621, 625 (N.D. Ill.
1955).
- See McLain v.Jarecki, note 20 supra and In re Lender's Estate, 164 F.2d 128
(3d Cir. 1947).

2" See Estate of Ruxton, 20 T. C. 487 (1953), where H, fearing that he would
lose allof his property from a pending lawsuit, set up a trust which gave a life
estate to his daughter and a contingent life estate to his wife with remainders over.
On the same day W set up a trust giving H a life estate with remainders over.
The court found that the only concert of action between H and W occurred in the
final stages of the transaction. The court was further influenced by the fact that
there was no quid pro quo in that, according to the court, if the trusts were uncrossed and each settlor-regarded as the grantor of the trust of which he was the
beneficiary, they would be placed in an untenable position in regard to the giving
of quid pro quo to induce the action of the other.
2 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Another important factor in the determination of a particular case
24
is illustrated in Estate of Lindsay v. Commissioner where W had told
her son, who prepared the trusts, not to tell H that she was creating a
trust similar to the one which he was creating. The court was satisfied
that there was no tacit agreement or understanding between the settlors.
The fact that the amounts were almost similar was explained by the
testimony of the son that he suggested the amount of the res for W's
trust.
Thus, where the actual consideration test is applied, the taxpayer
burden of proof that the trusts were not
has more readily maintained the
25
other.
each
of
in consideration
If the court holds that the trusts are reciprocal, the problem arises as
to the amount includible in the estates. When the trusts are of unequal
size, the general rule is that both trusts are taxable but only to the extent
of the smaller trust. 26

When an addition is made to one of the trusts

which have been found reciprocal and the addition makes the amounts
of the two trusts equal, all is included even though the addition is made
years after the trust was originally created unless surrounding circum27
stances and evidence show that the addition was a separate gift.
It is submitted that the actual consideration test is a poor one. If a
court has to find an act or promise bargained for and given in exchange
for another act or promise, 28 many transfers of a testamentary nature
will escape taxation. It is obvious that motives should not be an escape
29
device because if the taxpayers want "to keep the stock in the family
30
or "to protect their children from improvident marriages" they could
accomplish the same resput by making a gift in trust to their children
without reserving crossed powers such as life estates which under 2036
of the Code are testamentary dispositions.
See also Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d
242 T. C. 174 (1943).
1953) and Estate of Ruxton, note 22 mpra.
874 (3d Cir.
' See Estate of Arnold Resch v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. 171 (1953), where
two months before W set up a trust for the benefit of H, H had given her $100,000
worth of bonds which became the corpus. No conditions were attached to the
gift. W had requested a bank to help her invest the bonds and a trust was suggested. W talked this over with H and secured his cooperation before creating
the trust that the bank had suggested. It was held that these facts did not warrant
a finding that she was acting in concert with H so as to make him the settlor.
See also Welch v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 1139 (1947) (income tax).
2 See e.g., Estate of Oliver, 1944 P-H T. C. Mem. Dec. 138; Estate of Frederick
S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941). See Estate of Carolyn Peck Boardman, 20 T. C.
871 (1953), where the settlor of the smaller trust died. Under Rule 50 his estate
was taxed by multiplying the value of the cross trust at his death by the following
fraction: the value of the property at the time transferred by the decedent over the
value of the property at the time transferred by the other settlor. See Note, 38
A. L. R. 2d 522, 527 (1954).
"Estate of Carolyn Peck Boardman, 20 T. C. 871 (1953) (four years).
0 This test was used in In re Leuder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
0 See Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).

"0Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Unless the transactions are taxed in the donors' estates, the use of
reciprocal trusts allows a taxpayer to rid his estate of assets at gift
tax rates and at the same time receive valuable lifetime economic powers
in return.31 This coupled with the fact that he has, at the same time,
who also
given identical economic benefits to a member of his family,
32
escapes estate taxation, should justify remedial legislation.
The Third Circuit has recognized that the actual consideration test
applied in that court is substantially different from the so-called inferred
consideration test. It has suggested that the situation could be cured
by legislation which would treat these transfers as a single joint transaction and thereby regard each of the settlors as a pro tanto transferor
of the res over which he has control.33 It is submitted that this statutory solution would be an equitable one in that the inherent nature of
the normal family relationship is one of interdependence and concert of
34
action.
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Gift and Inheritance Taxation of Community Property by Common
Law States
Generally, when a transfer of property occurs by gift or upon the
death of an individual, its taxability depends upon the policy within the
taxing jurisdiction and upon the extent of the interest transferred.
Granting that the problem of determining the extent of the interest transferred is often a difficult one, it becomes more complex when community
property is transferred by a husband to his wife due to the prior interest
of the wife which must be taken into account. It is a novel situation
when this problem arises within a common law jurisdiction, and several
recent decisions merit analysis.
The problem, as it relates to gift taxation, recently confronted the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Terjen.1 A
" See Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S.
636 (1929), where the taxpayer argued that reciprocal trusts which were in contemplation of death should be treated as a bona fide sale.

See also Estate of

Scholler v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 235 (1940).
" See Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 893 § 6 (1949), where Congress

impliedly approved the "judicial fiction" of the Lehmalp case by allowing, for a
limited time, a tax free rescission of reciprocal trusts.
" Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1953). It
would seem that the legislation would be more equitable if it established a conclusive presumption of consideration when the trusts with crossed powers are
created by members of one family within two years of each other. If the second
trust is established more than two years after the first, the commissioner should be
required to prove that each trust was in consideration of the other. Thus, the
taxpayers would have a certain amount of freedom in disposing of their property.
"' See in general Notes, 42 CALiF. L. REv. 151 (1954) and 38 A. L. R. 2d 522

(1954).
1

Va. -,

90 S. E. 2d 801 (1956).

